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ABSTRACT
Recent years have witnessed the proliferation of
allegations concerning sexual abuse by clergymembers,
along with its concealment by institutional leaders, in a
variety of religious communities in the U.S. Many victimsurvivors report being doubly injured when they have
attempted to obtain redress from religious institutions for
the harms they have suffered. Increasingly, they have turned
to tort law as a venue for obtaining compensation and
effecting changes in policy. Of the numerous causes of action
victim-survivors have invoked against religious institutions,
especially the Roman Catholic Church, this Article focuses
on respondeat superior vicarious liability. It identifies and
assesses four ways courts have evaluated respondeat
superior claims against the institutions where accused
clergymembers have worked. One approach has been
categorically to dismiss vicarious liability claims related to
clergy sexual abuse; another has been to allow such claims
only when an abuser’s actions can be cognized as mistaken
attempts to perform authorized job responsibilities. In a
third approach, courts have considered whether sexual abuse
is a characteristic risk of religious ministry. The approach
that best achieves the rationales for vicarious liability and
best balances the interests of all parties is the fourth, a factintensive inquiry that investigates what courts have called
the “causal nexus” or “close connection” between the specific
circumstances of a tort and the authority with which an
employer has clothed an alleged offender.
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INTRODUCTION

When someone whom a religious institution holds out as
a representative of the divine commits sexual abuse, who
should bear the earthly liability? And should it matter
whether the institution had forewarning about the abuse or
should have taken precautions to prevent it? These are but
two of the important legal questions prompted by recent
revelations about sexual abuse by clergymembers1 in a
variety of religious institutions, especially the Roman
Catholic Church. Exploring the contours of the tort doctrine
of respondeat superior vicarious liability, this Article
identifies the four ways courts have assessed respondeat
superior claims against institutions that employ alleged
perpetrators. Of these four approaches, the one that best
balances the interests of all parties is a fact-intensive one
that has been formulated by courts both in the U.S. and
overseas. Some jurisdictions have dubbed this method the
“close connection test,” while others have focused on the
“causal nexus” between the specific circumstances of a tort
and the authority with which an employer has clothed an
alleged offender.
At the start, it is necessary to emphasize that sexual
abuse at the hands of a clergymember often carries tragic
consequences for victim-survivors. One prominent
psychotherapist has dubbed it the “soul-murder” of a young
or vulnerable person who may spend the remainder of life
struggling to regain the capacity to trust other human

1. Throughout this Article, I employ the term “clergymember” to refer
generically to employees whom religious institutions hold out as possessing
ministerial authority, that is, authority that is specifically religious rather than
administrative. Religious traditions employ a variety of nomenclatures to
designate such leaders; within Christianity, these differences are driven by the
radically divergent theologies of ministry and leadership that denominations
have developed. This usage is technically imprecise in the context of Roman
Catholicism, where as a matter of canon law the clergy comprises only those who
have received the sacrament of holy orders—bishops, priests, and deacons—not
religious sisters, brothers, or others who, despite having professed vows, are not
ordained. See 1983 CODE C.207, §§ 1–2.
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beings, let alone believe in an ultimate reality.2 Studies have
catalogued the negative sequelae of sexual abuse, including
difficulties in forming and maintaining personal
relationships, obtaining employment, and succeeding at
work; serious mental health challenges, including
dissociation and depression; and rates of substance abuse
and suicide that far exceed national averages.3 Those
victimized by clergymembers experience these harms in a
distinctive way, since, very often, they or their families
trusted their abusers to uphold the moral standards of their
religious tradition—in short, trusted them to stand in the
place of God.
A substantial number of victim-survivors have reported
being doubly injured when they have attempted to obtain
redress for the harms they have suffered.4 Victim-survivors
have experienced the injuries their abuses originally
inflicted to be compounded when religious leaders have
covered up abuse or placed an institution’s reputation ahead
of the needs of the injured. And so, haltingly at first and then
increasingly as the scope of clergy sexual abuse and its
concealment have come to light, victim-survivors have
turned to courts both to effect institutional change and to
obtain the compensation that religious institutions have
often failed to provide.
Clergy sexual abuse, tort law, and constitutional law
intersect in complex and sometimes surprising ways. Among
the issues are the applicability of the so-called church
autonomy doctrine and its relationship to a “neutral
principles” approach to litigation involving religious
institutions,5 the relevance of other First Amendment
2. See generally MARY GAIL FRAWLEY-O’DEA, PERVERSION OF POWER: SEXUAL
ABUSE IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 8 (2007) (quoting the classic formulation of
LEONARD SHENGOLD, SOUL MURDER (1989)).
3. Id. at 22–36.
4. Id. at 132–37.
5. The classic “neutral principles” case is Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679
(1871). The “church autonomy” doctrine has been severely criticized by Marci
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defenses to discovery and liability,6 the proposed tort of
clergy malpractice,7 the availability of civil Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act causes of
action,8 and the implications for tort plaintiffs when religious
institutions declare bankruptcy to manage their liability.9
While there is substantial scholarship on these and other
legal problems,10 commentators have written comparatively
little about respondeat superior vicarious liability, which
many courts, practitioners, and commentators have rejected
as inapplicable to clergy sexual abuse lawsuits.
Hamilton in her numerous writings. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Religious
Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099
(2004); Marci A. Hamilton, The Rules against Scandal and What They Mean for
the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, 69 MD. L. REV. 115 (2009); Marci A.
Hamilton, The “Licentiousness” in Religious Organizations and Why It Is Not
Protected under Religious Liberty Constitutional Provisions, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 953 (2010). For defenses of the church autonomy doctrine, see, e.g., Victor
E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Church Autonomy Doctrine: Where Tort
Law Should Step Aside, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 431 (2011).
6. See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the
Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219 (2000).
7. See generally Emily C. Short, Comment, Torts: Praying for the Parish or
Preying on the Parish? Clergy Sexual Misconduct and the Tort of Clergy
Malpractice, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 183 (2004). Cases rejecting a distinctive tort of
clergy malpractice include Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 285 (Colo. 1988);
Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446, 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (entertaining
negligence claims against clergy, but only when directed “at conduct other than
the defendants’ performance of their clerical duties”).
8. See generally Nicholas R. Mancini, Comment, Mobsters in the Monastery?
Applicability of Civil RICO to the Clergy Sexual Misconduct Scandal and the
Catholic Church, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 193 (2002). Few civil RICO actions
have been pursued in the context of clergy abuse, but a recent suit filed against
the Catholic diocese of Buffalo, New York, included RICO as a cause of action.
Michael Mroziak, Attorney’s Lawsuit against Diocese Includes RICO Action,
WBFO (Aug. 16, 2019), https://news.wbfo.org/post/attorneys-lawsuit-againstdiocese-includes-rico-action.
9. See generally Simon W. Bright, Comment, The Costly Exercise of Religion:
Issues on Diocesan Bankruptcy Estate Formation and First Amendment
Implications, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 695 (2017).
10. See generally JAMES T. O’REILLY & MARGARET S.P. CHALMERS, THE CLERGY
SEX ABUSE CRISIS AND THE LEGAL RESPONSES (2014); Jeffrey R. Anderson et al.,
When Clergy Fail Their Flock: Litigating the Clergy Sexual Abuse Case, 91 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 151 (2004); Thomas P. Doyle & Stephen C. Rubino, Catholic Clergy
Sexual Abuse Meets the Civil Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 549 (2004).
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To be sure, a majority of U.S. courts have dismissed
respondeat superior causes of action against religious
institutions, sometimes in a perfunctory or conclusory
manner. However, a minority of U.S. courts, as well as
prominent courts in other common-law jurisdictions, have
imposed vicarious liability in cases where tortfeasors have
taken advantage of the authority religious institutions have
conferred upon them to cultivate and then violate their
victims’ trust. By replacing the traditional “scope of
employment” test for respondeat superior vicarious liability
with a fact-intensive inquiry into the connection between the
abuse and the abuser’s duties, these courts have remained
faithful to the rationales underlying the doctrine of vicarious
liability, including deterrence, compensation, and the
allocation of risks to the parties that generate them.
Because this Article draws most of its examples from
litigation involving abuse claims against the Roman Catholic
Church,11 it is especially worth noting that Catholicism has
not been the only religious tradition in which sexual abuse
has been reported and concealed. In the past year alone,
there have been well-publicized scandals concerning sexual
misconduct by Buddhist monks,12 Episcopal priests,13

11. Perhaps unsurprisingly for the world’s largest organized religion, which
operates the world’s oldest bureaucracy, forms of ministry in the Catholic Church
are numerous. As observed supra note 1, this Article uses the term
“clergymember” in a broad, vernacular sense.
12. See, e.g., Kimberley Phillips, A Culture of Clerical Immunity in Myanmar
Is Putting Children at Risk of Abuse, TIME (Dec. 6, 2018, 2:30 AM),
https://time.com/5470903/clerical-sexual-abuse-children-buddhist-monksmyanmar/; Lusha Zhang & Philip Wen, Buddhist Monk Master in China Resigns
After Sexual Misconduct Allegations, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2018, 1:59 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-harassment-religion/buddhist-monkmaster-in-china-resigns-after-sexual-misconduct-allegations-idUSKBN1L00HR.
13. See, e.g., David Crary, Episcopal Church Confronts Past Role in Sexual
Exploitation, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/
f64e7e1d40c8432fbad07496096daefa.
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Conservative rabbis,14 and evangelical pastors,15 among
other religious leaders. But the Catholic Church is the
largest religious institution worldwide, and in U.S. courts
the greatest number of abuse lawsuits have involved
Catholic clergymembers. In recent years, grand juries and
attorneys general in Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and other states have
undertaken investigations into the scope of abuse and its
concealment within the church.16
During the nearly thirty-five years since reports of
sexual abuse by Catholic clergy first came to public notice,
tort litigation has played a substantial role in exposing the
scope of the problem, with more than 3,000 civil lawsuits
filed and more than $3 billion paid out in settlements to
date.17 In total, more than 6,700 Catholic priests and 19
bishops who served between the years 1950 and 2016 have
been accused of abusing more than 18,500 victims.18
Although deference to religious institutions in general, and
the Roman Catholic Church in particular,19 may have

14. See, e.g., Jared Foretek, Sex Abuse Allegations Hit Home for Conservative
Movement, WASH. JEWISH WEEK (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonjewish
week.com/42751/sex-abuse-allegations-hit-home-for-conservativemovement/news/.
15. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dias, Her Evangelical Megachurch Was Her World.
Then Her Daughter Said She Was Molested by a Minister, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2019, at A1; Robert Downen, Lise Olsen & John Tedesco, Abuse of Faith: 20 Years,
700 Victims: Southern Baptist Sexual Abuse Spreads as Leaders Resist Reforms,
HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/
investigations/article/Southern-Baptist-sexual-abuse-spreads-as-leaders13588038.php.
16. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., COMMONWEALTH OF PA., REPORT I OF
GRAND JURY
REPORT (2018)].
THE 40TH STATEWIDE INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY (2018) [hereinafter

17. Data on the Crisis: The Human Toll, BISHOP ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/AtAGlance/data.htm (last visited July 24,
2019).
18. Id.; see also SECRETARIAT OF CHILD AND YOUTH PROT. & NAT’L REVIEW BD.,
U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT (2019).
19. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 329 (2d ed. 2018).
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contributed to the quiet settlement or dismissal of many
early suits, tort litigation has become “one of several
institutional venues in which policy responses to clergy
sexual abuse were forged.”20 Litigation and associated media
coverage has helped to publicize what Timothy Lytton has
dubbed a “plaintiffs’ framing of clergy sexual abuse.”21
Plaintiffs’ attorneys have characterized abuse “as an
institutional failure,” not, as some religious employers have
presented it, as the terrible, but independent and perhaps
even unpreventable, misconduct of a small number of
depraved clergy.22 This framing appears not only in tort suits
but also grand jury reports (e.g., the 2018 Pennsylvania
grand jury’s report, which declared that dioceses operated a
“circle of secrecy,” working from “a playbook for concealing
the truth”23) and media narratives (e.g., the 2015 Academy
Award-winning film Spotlight,24 which documented the
efforts of Boston Globe journalists to uncover the church’s
attempts to conceal abuse and hide abusers).
Clergy abuse plaintiffs have invoked numerous causes of
action. Because Catholic clergymembers typically have few
assets (and some, such as monks and nuns, have taken vows
of poverty and are therefore inherently judgment-proof),
plaintiffs have sought to recover not only against their
abusers but also against the institutions that employed
them, including parishes, dioceses and their bishops,
provinces and other administrative units of religious orders,
and church-operated institutions, such as hospitals, schools,
and universities.25 Whereas plaintiffs have typically alleged
20. TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE 6 (2008).
21. Id. at 101.
22. Id. at 87.
23. GRAND JURY REPORT (2018), supra note 16, at 299, 3.
24. SPOTLIGHT (Open Road Films 2015).
25. At the risk of oversimplification, the Latin Rite of the Roman Catholic
Church employs two overlapping systems of organization. (The Latin Rite
comprises the vast majority of Catholics globally and is distinct from the Eastern
Catholic Churches, such as the Byzantine Catholic Church.) The better-known
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battery, assault, and intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress directly against abusers, against religious
employers they have tended to plead various forms of
negligence (especially negligent hiring, supervision, and
retention), along with breach of fiduciary duty and vicarious
liability.
Plaintiffs have faced substantial challenges in
negligence and fiduciary duty litigation. Some early claims
were barred by state charitable immunity laws.26 Until
recently, when some state legislatures began to relax
statutes of limitations or open windows for the revival of
older claims many plaintiffs found that their suits were timebarred.27 Religious employers have frequently invoked First
Amendment defenses, arguing (with varying degrees of
success) that decisions to ordain, assign, reassign, or remove
clergymembers are matters of religious discipline that are
unreviewable by courts because they are reserved to
ecclesiastical authorities.28 Institutional defendants have
structures are those of the diocesan (“secular”) clergy: the church divides the
world geographically into dioceses, which it then subdivides into parishes.
Dioceses are governed by bishops nominated by the pope, while parishes are
entrusted to pastors chosen by the local bishop. At the same time, religious orders
and their members are governed through parallel structures: for global orders
such as the Jesuits, Franciscans, and Dominicans, the heads of geographical
provinces are appointed by and answer to a worldwide superior general, usually
based in Rome. There are many exceptions to these observations. In the United
States, the church is organized civilly in a complicated variety of ways, not all of
which correspond to canonical structures. For discussion of the organization of
the Catholic Church, see generally THOMAS J. REESE, INSIDE THE VATICAN (1998).
26. See, e.g., Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 472 A.2d 531,
537–38 (N.J. 1984), limited by Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 902 A.2d 900
(N.J. 2006).
27. On the relationship between the statute of limitations and sexual abuse,
memories of which victims frequently suppress for years, see, e.g., Doe v. Salesian
Society, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 565 (Ct. App. 2008); Theodore R.A. Ovrom, Note,
Reasonable for Whom? Developing a More Sensible Approach to the Discovery
Rule in Civil Actions Based on Childhood Sexual Abuse, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1843
(2018); Deborah A. Connolly et al., Twenty-Six Years Prosecuting Historic Child
Sexual Abuse Cases: Has Anything Changed?, 23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 166
(2017).
28. See, e.g., Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 283–89 (Colo. 1988); Moses
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also invoked the priest-penitent privilege to shield church
documents, including clergy personnel files, from
discovery.29 Some courts have held that, absent special
circumstances, religious institutions do not owe fiduciary
duties to members and their families.30 But even in those
negligence suits where courts resolve such threshold matters
in plaintiffs’ favor, often there is insufficient evidence for a
plaintiff to prove that church leaders should have been aware
of the risk that a particular clergymember posed.31

v. Diocese of Colorado., 863 P.2d 310, 318–21 (Colo. 1993); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563
N.W.2d 434, 440–45 (Wis. 1997); Sonnier v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette,
No. 6:16-CV-1229, 2017 WL 778153, at *4 (W.D. La. Jan. 18, 2017); Davis v.
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 852 P.2d 640 (Mont. 1993). But see,
e.g., Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 796
(App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997); JC2 v. Grammond, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1170 (D. Or.
2002).
29. See, e.g., Soc’y of Jesus of New England v. Com., 808 N.E.2d 272 (Mass.
2004).
30. See, e.g., H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 98–99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). But
see Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 989 F. Supp. 110,
117 (D. Conn. 1997).
31. This is not to say that all plaintiffs who have initiated causes of action for
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty have been unsuccessful. There is not
space here for full treatment of negligence cases against religious institutions,
but see generally LYTTON, supra note 20. Among other cases where causes of
action for breach of fiduciary duty have survived threshold challenges, see Fortin
v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208, 1232 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct.
2005).
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II. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN GENERAL
Many plaintiffs have invoked respondeat superior
vicarious liability as an additional or alternative cause of
action in suits against religious employers. Generally
speaking, vicarious liability constitutes an exception to tort
law’s rule that liability follows fault: a party held vicariously
liable for the tort of another is obligated to pay damages even
if it is blameless for the injury that occurred. Vicarious
liability is therefore a form of strict liability: so long as a
person for whose actions a vicariously liable defendant is
responsible commits a tort in qualifying circumstances, then
judgment lies even where the defendant took all appropriate
precautions.32
In the U.S., vicarious liability functions as a subset of the
law of agency.33 Scholars have offered competing accounts of
the origins and development of vicarious liability, tracing its
roots to Roman and early Germanic law. Among several
forms of vicarious liability, the doctrine of respondeat
superior, Latin for “let the master answer,” holds an
employer liable for injuries caused by its employees.34
Several well-recognized limitations cabin the reach of
respondeat superior vicarious liability. One, captured in the
distinction between “detour” and “frolic,” holds an employer
liable when an employee commits a tort on a brief, usually
authorized diversion from the normal course of duty, but not
when the employee departs significantly from the employer’s
business.35 A second limitation restricts respondeat superior
32. See generally PAULA GILIKER, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN TORT: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2010); ANTHONY GRAY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY:
CRITIQUE AND REFORM (2018).
33. GRAY, supra note 32, at 89.
34. Two primary rationales have been advanced for this doctrine. One, the
“servant’s tort theory,” explains that the doctrine imposes liability on employers
for the wrongful conduct of their employees; the other, the “master’s tort theory,”
deems the employer liable by attribution. GILIKER, supra note 32, at 13.
35. The classic treatment of this distinction is Young B. Smith, Frolic and
Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1923).
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vicarious liability to situations where the relationship
between the tortfeasor and vicariously liable defendant is
that of employee-employer.36 Vicarious liability has typically
not been imposed in cases involving independent contractors
and other non-employees who may act, or be seen to act, on
a defendant’s behalf;37 it has, however, sometimes been
imputed to volunteers.38 Third, the “borrowed servant”
doctrine comes into play where a tortfeasor may be, or may
act as, the employee of more than one employer
simultaneously.39 Its contours vary among jurisdictions, but
many courts impose respondeat superior vicarious liability
on the “borrowing” employer (say, a general contractor who
leased a crane from an equipment rental company and
arranged for the rental company’s employees to operate it) if
the plaintiff can show that the original employer (the rental
company) allowed its employee to work for the borrowing
employer and if at the time of the tort the employee’s work
was in practice under the borrowing employer’s control.40
But the most significant limitation on the doctrine of
respondeat superior vicarious liability, and the one on which
this Article will focus, limits the doctrine’s operation to cases
36. A parallel doctrine, that of apparent agency vicarious liability, applies
when the relationship is agent-principal rather than employee-employer. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCS 43–45, 79 (3d ed. 2018).
For its application in the intentional tort context, see, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of
Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 329–31 (Colo. 1993). Few cases involving clergy sexual
abuse have invoked the apparent agency doctrine, and this Article does not
consider it further. Nor does this Article examine the sporadic cases in which
plaintiffs have asked courts to impose vicarious liability on religious employers
for ratifying clergymembers’ torts. See, e.g., Brownlee v. Catholic Charities of
Archdiocese of Chicago, No. 16-CV-00665, 2018 WL 1519155 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28,
2018); Gagne v. O’Donoghue, No. CA 941158, 1996 WL 1185145 (Mass. Super.
Ct. June 26, 1996).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
38. Id. at § 225.
39. See DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS,
ed. 2012).

AND

LLCS 132 (4th

40. See id. at 133; see, e.g., Parker v. Vanderbilt Univ., 767 S.W.2d 412, 416
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); see also Morgan v. ABC Mfr., 710 So. 2d 1077, 1079–82
(La. 1998).
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where a tortfeasor is acting within the scope of her or his
employment. The modern “scope of employment” test
emerged from the practice of judges who, historically,
inquired whether the actions of a “servant” were for the
benefit or purpose of the “master”; they held the master
vicariously liable only if the answer was yes.41 In the U.S.,
the Restatement (Second) of Agency offers the most
influential test for determining whether an employee is
acting within the scope of employment:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but
only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space
limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master,
and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another,
the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it
is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized
time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the
master.42

Debates about the interpretation of these provisions, and of

41. GRAY, supra note 32, at 12–20.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (AM. LAW. INST. 1958); cf. id.
§ 209. The Third Restatement offers a somewhat broader formulation:
An employee acts within the scope of employment when performing work
assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to
the employer’s control. An employee’s act is not within the scope of
employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not
intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2006). By abandoning
the framework of the Second Restatement, in which a plaintiff bears the burden
of proving each of the four elements of § 228(1)(a)–(d), the Third Restatement is
more friendly to plaintiffs. While most of the cases this Article discusses below
cite the Second Restatement, the Third Restatement better reflects the results of
these and similar cases.
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counterpart common-law rules in various states and
countries, form the backdrop to almost all the cases
discussed below.
But if respondeat superior vicarious liability runs
counter to the usual rules of tort law, why have courts
imposed it? “It is fair to say that it has proven to be extremely
difficult to articulate a unifying rationale for the law
regarding vicarious liability.”43 Courts have struggled to map
the boundaries of respondeat superior vicarious liability in
ways that limit its reach only to cases where an employer can
reasonably, or perhaps even morally, be said to bear
responsibility for employees’ torts. It is not surprising,
therefore, that courts have often turned to public policy
rationales, far more here than in regard to other tort
doctrines.
Courts and commentators typically cite three rationales
for respondeat superior vicarious liability.44 The first of them
concerns deterrence. The threat of being held strictly liable
for employees’ torts should prompt employers to take
measures to minimize the risk that injuries will occur. For
instance, employers might screen prospective employees
more carefully, discipline or discharge careless employees
more rigorously, and install safety mechanisms more
comprehensively. When they know courts will impose
liability even in the absence of fault, employers will have an
incentive to minimize risk—or, at least, so goes the theory.
Proponents of this rationale have suggested that vicarious
liability is particularly effective where it may not be possible
for a fact-finder to determine whether an employer has been
negligent; in such instances, vicarious liability can serve as
a practical substitute for negligence.45 Yet critics have

43. GRAY, supra note 32, at 21.
44. KLEINBERGER, supra note 39, at 101.
45. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Institutional Liability for Employees’
Intentional Torts: Vicarious Liability as a Quasi-Substitute for Punitive
Damages, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2018).
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cautioned that vicarious liability does not necessarily
produce the promised deterrence. Where the cost of
implementing safeguards is higher than the cost of paying
judgments, an employer will have no economic motivation to
act.
A second rationale involves compensation. Where
employees are judgment-proof, vicarious liability can
increase the chance that victims will receive compensation
for injuries. And related to compensation is a third rationale,
the one most strongly advocated by law and economics
scholars. They have noted that vicarious liability efficiently
allocates to employers the costs of torts arising from their
business. Employers, unlike victims and employees,
generally have the capacity to spread such costs across their
operations, whether by increasing prices or rates or
purchasing liability insurance.46 Several commentators have
described this rationale in enterprise risk terms: that is,
vicarious liability assigns to an employer the full cost its
operations impose on society at large.47 Other scholars have
used alternative language, describing the rationale as that of
“balancing the damage inflicted by agents in the course and
scope of their agency against the benefit that the principal
gets from the agent’s work.”48
But while courts have broadly embraced vicarious
liability in negligence cases, most jurisdictions have been
hesitant to do so when torts are intentional. This is
particularly true for sexual abuse and other forms of sexual
misconduct. Because sexual torts rarely advance (or even

46. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and
the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Guido Calabresi, The Decision for
Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713
(1965).
47. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE
L.J. 1231, 1246 (1984).
48. Kelly W.G. Clark et al., Of Compelling Interest: The Intersection of
Religious Freedom and Civil Liability in the Portland Priest Sex Abuse Cases, 85
OR. L. REV. 481, 489 (2006).
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seek to advance) an employer’s interest, and because
employers do not authorize or permit sexual misconduct,
courts have routinely found, under the scope of employment
test, that these intentional torts do not fall within the scope
of employment and cannot be imputed to employers. Many
courts have treated this conclusion as so self-evident that
they have resolved the issue as a matter of law.
Dismissing respondeat superior vicarious liability cases
where employees have committed sexual misconduct is one
of four approaches that courts have taken. The other three,
which courts have not always distinguished with clarity,
permit but seek to limit the reach of respondeat superior
vicarious liability. In one line of cases, courts have imposed
liability where they have been able to cognize an employee’s
sexual misconduct as a misguided attempt to perform
authorized duties. In a second line of cases, courts have held
employers liable for intentional torts that can be said to be
characteristic risks of their enterprise. Still other courts have
undertaken fact-intensive inquiries into the relationship
between an employee’s authorized responsibilities and the
tort being alleged.
Each of the next four Parts describes one of these
approaches, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages
with reference to cases involving private employers.
Numerous other cases have involved sexual misconduct by
employees of the state—e.g., police officers, other law
enforcement personnel, and government officials—but this
Article deliberately omits them from further consideration.
These cases implicate the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and involve claims about the coercive authority with which
society clothes public officials, especially police officers.49

49. I am grateful to Jed Shugerman for this point. Cases where governments
have been held vicariously liable for the sexual misconduct of law enforcement
officers include Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, where the court observed that
“[p]olice officers occupy a unique position of trust in our society” and that “[t]hose
who challenge an officer’s actions do so at their peril.” 814 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Cal.
1991). California courts have generally refused to apply Mary M. to tortfeasors
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Private employees, by contrast, do not wield authority over
life and death, arrest, incarceration, or deportation. Even
though some religious institutions teach their followers that
clergymembers may be able to affect their standing in the
afterlife, courts have typically not analogized their authority
with that of police and other public employees.

other than police. See, e.g., Z.V. v. Cty. of Riverside, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 570, 576–
80 (Ct. App. 2015). Among similar cases, see St. John v. United States, 240 F.3d
671 (8th Cir. 2001); Red Elk v. United States, 62 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1995); Cox
v. Evansville Police Department, 107 N.E.3d 453 (Ind. 2018). But see Primeaux v.
United States, 181 F.3d 876, 882 (8th Cir. 1999) (refusing to impose liability on
the Bureau of Indian Affairs for a rape perpetrated by one of its officers, noting
that the officer was “unarmed, out of uniform, and off duty, insofar as his law
enforcement responsibilities were concerned”).
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III. FIRST APPROACH: NO RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
As seen above, a majority of U.S. courts have elected not
to impose vicarious liability on employers for the sexual
misconduct of their employees. A sampling of cases
illustrates the courts’ tendency to find, under the scope of
employment test, that sexual misconduct is simply not
within a tortfeasor’s duties. In Georgia, a court dismissed a
respondeat superior claim against an employee’s former
employer, holding that her supervisor’s sexual harassment
was “not in furtherance of [the defendant’s] business but
independent of the relation of master and servant.”50 A
boarding school likewise escaped respondeat superior
liability for a teacher’s sexual misconduct with one of his
students because his actions were “personal in nature and
unrelated to the performance of [his] employment duties.”51
In Connecticut, a court granted summary judgment in favor
of another boarding school in similar circumstances,
dismissing a respondeat superior claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiff could not
show that the school intended its teacher to abuse him.52
Even where the circumstances of a tortfeasor’s
employment have facilitated sexual misconduct, most courts
have persisted in refusing to impose vicarious liability. In
Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, a
hospital lab technician purported to perform an ultrasound
examination on a pregnant woman but penetrated her with
his fingers and ultrasound wand.53 The Supreme Court of
California affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the

50. Cox v. Brazo, 303 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983), aff’d, 307 S.E.2d 474
(Ga. 1983); see also Doe v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 628 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th
Cir. 2010).
51. Doe v. Vill. of St. Joseph, 415 S.E.2d 56, 57 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
52. Doe v. Hotchkiss Sch., No. 3:15-CV-160 (VAB), 2019 WL 1099027, at *15
(D. Conn. Mar. 8, 2019).
53. 907 P.2d 358, 359–60 (Cal. 1995).
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hospital, holding that because the technician “simply took
advantage of solitude with a naïve patient to commit an
assault,” therefore “his motivating emotions were not
causally attributable to his employment,” and “those
personal motivations were not generated by or an outgrowth
of workplace responsibilities, conditions, or events.”54 A
lower California court relied on Lisa M. in a subsequent case
involving a scoutmaster who repeatedly molested a member
of his troop during overnight events. The court was
emphatic: “we reject the proposition that simply because the
scoutmaster/scouting relationship provided the opportunity”
for the abuse, the Scouts should be held vicariously liable for
the scoutmaster’s misconduct.55
Courts have hesitated to impose vicarious liability for
the sexual misconduct of employees generally, but they have
been especially reticent to do so for clergy. In many
jurisdictions, courts have held, as a matter of law, that no
reasonable factfinder could conclude that sexual misconduct
is within the scope of a clergymember’s employment.
Paradigmatic of the numerous cases of this variety is
Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of New
Orleans, in which the Fifth Circuit upheld a grant of
summary judgment for two religious employers.56 Ronald
Tichenor alleged that his boyhood priest, Dino Cinel, had
taken sexually explicit photographs and videos of him, as
well as “performed illicit acts upon him.”57 Tichenor sued the
priest, the parish, and the local archdiocese. Both the district
court and the Fifth Circuit rejected his respondeat superior
theory, the Fifth Circuit doing so in two paragraphs that

54. Id. at 364; see also Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. Palladino, 580 S.E.2d 215, 216
(Ga. 2003); G.L. v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., Inc., 757 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Or. 1988).
55. Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 24 (Ct. App. 2000).
56. 32 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1994). Many commentators trace public awareness
of sexual abuse by Catholic clergy in the U.S. to another Louisiana case, that of
Gilbert Gauthe. See generally JASON BERRY, LEAD US NOT INTO TEMPTATION
(1992).
57. Tichenor, 32 F.3d at 957.
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merit quotation in full:
We reject the contention that Cinel was acting within the scope
of his employment. Although a priest’s duties are less susceptible to
definition than, say, a store clerk, we can nonetheless outline the
basics. It is a priest’s duty to represent the word of God, as embodied
in the Scriptures. The central aspect of that duty is to aid people in
their relationship with God and, also, the Church. Moreover, it is
his duty to help others—whose paths may have wandered—to find
safety and security in the doctrines of Catholic theology.
It would be hard to imagine a more difficult argument than that
Cinel’s illicit sexual pursuits were somehow related to his duties as
a priest or that they in any way furthered the interests of St. Rita’s,
his employer. Instead, given Cinel’s vow of celibacy and the Catholic
Church’s unbending stand condemning homosexual relations,
Cinel’s acts represent the paradigmatic pursuit of “some purpose
unrelated to his master’s business”.58

The Fifth Circuit’s logic is straightforward: as a matter of
law, a priest’s employment responsibilities cannot include
sexual abuse. Cinel’s torts are by definition unrelated to his
employment and cannot advance his employer’s interests;
therefore, religious employers cannot be held vicariously
liable under respondeat superior. In Tichenor, the court
amplified these general rules with specific observations
about the Catholic Church’s teachings concerning the
behavior of clergy. For the court, the fact that the Church
prohibits sexual activity on the part of priests and strongly
rejects same-sex relations confirms that Cinel’s actions must
fall outside the scope of his employment.
Numerous courts have dismissed respondeat superior
causes of action against religious employers in similar terms,
sometimes applying the scope of employment test in detail,59

58. Id. at 959–60 (footnotes omitted).
59. See, e.g., Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 71 (D.
Conn. 1995); H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Alpharetta
First United Methodist Church v. Stewart, 472 S.E.2d 532, 535–36 (Ga. Ct. App.
1996); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Wis. 1997); N.H. v. Presbyterian
Church (U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 599 (Okla. 1999); Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp.
2d 742, 758 (M.D. Pa. 2007); Lara v. Legionaries of Christ, No.
X03HHDCV106016974S, 2011 WL 4347919, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 30,
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other times in more conclusory fashion.60 In litigation
involving Catholic clergy, courts have echoed the observation
in Tichenor that the church specifically forbids its priests to
engage in sexual conduct. Therefore, “[w]hen a priest has
sexual intercourse with a parishioner it is not part of the
priest’s duties nor customary within the business of the
church.”61 In perhaps the strongest statement of this variety,
the Supreme Court of Kentucky commented that to allow
respondeat superior causes of action “would in effect require
the diocese to become an absolute insurer for the behavior of
anyone who was in the priesthood.”62 Even in cases involving
other religious traditions, courts have repeatedly quoted the
remark in Tichenor that “[i]t would be hard to imagine a
more difficult argument” for clergy sexual abuse plaintiffs to
make.63
Distressing though this approach has been to many
2011); Bernie v. Catholic Diocese of Sioux Falls, 821 N.W.2d 232, 237 (S.D. 2012).
60. See, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 245–46 (Mo. 1997); Dumais
v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese, No. X07CV010077631S, 2002 WL 31015708,
at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 31, 2002).
61. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287 (Colo. 1988).
62. Osborne v. Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Ky. 2000).
63. E.g., Kennedy v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, Vermont, Inc.,
921 F. Supp. 231, 233 (D. Vt. 1996); Bernie, 821 N.W.2d at 239; Doe v. Kanakuk
Ministries, No. 3:13–CV–3030–G, 2014 WL 3673029, at *7 (N.D. Tex. July 24,
2014). Occasionally, courts that have rejected respondeat superior causes of
action have distinguished the cases before them from the exceptional sets of
circumstances, which will be discussed in the following three Parts, in which
other courts have occasionally imposed vicarious liability. See, e.g., Doe v. Villa
Marie Educ. Ctr., No. FBTCV165032101S, 2017 WL 3671352, at *4 (Conn. Super.
Ct. July 20, 2017); Givens v. St. Adalbert Church, No. HHDCV126032459S, 2014
WL 5094304, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 17, 2014); Gough v. St. Peters
Episcopal, No. CV106012967S, 2011 WL 2611747, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June
2, 2011). In California, where an employer can be held vicariously liable for torts
that are foreseeable within the context of a particular employment situation,
courts have held specifically that sexual assault is not a foreseeable outcome of
the duties that clergymembers or religious schoolteachers are hired to perform.
See, e.g., Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (Ct. App.
1986) (“It would defy every notion of logic and fairness to say that sexual activity
between a priest and a parishioner is characteristic of the Archbishop of the
Roman Catholic Church.”); Jeffrey E. v. Cent. Baptist Church, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128,
130 (Ct. App. 1988).
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victim-survivors of sexual abuse, it does possess some
advantages. First, it recognizes that employees who commit
sexual misconduct are not acting on their employers’ behalf.
It acknowledges that employers—and perhaps religious
employers in a particular way—do not intend their
employees to commit sexual misconduct and often take
measures to prevent it, and so this approach upholds the
general tort principle that liability is not imposed without
fault. Because this approach allows courts simply to dismiss
respondeat superior claims as a matter of law, it does not
necessitate inquiries into the internal communications,
decisions, or doctrines of religious institutions, which in turn
avoids the constitutional challenges that can arise when
courts examine religious employers’ personnel practices.
Therefore, this approach affirms what some commentators
have called the doctrine of church autonomy. It likewise
promotes judicial economy, because it enables courts to
dispose of vicarious liability causes of action with minimal
litigation.
But these advantages come at a price. Because this
approach bars plaintiffs from recovering from religious
employers unless they are able to make out a case for
negligence or another cause of action, it lowers the chance
that those injured by clergy sexual abuse will be able to
obtain redress. As noted above, plaintiffs often find it
difficult to prevail in negligence claims against religious
employers. Sometimes there is insufficient evidence that an
institution knew or should have known about an employee’s
misconduct, especially if a particular victim was the first to
be abused by that employee. Moreover, institutions often
raise constitutional objections to the investigation of their
internal practices. Because abusive clergymembers are often
judgment-proof, a bar to recovery against religious
employers often renders plaintiffs unable to receive the
resources necessary to address the harms inflicted upon
them. At the same time, as appears in greater depth below,
this approach fails to acknowledge the reality that the
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authority with which employers, especially religious
employers, clothe their employees may facilitate the
commission of sexual torts. In numerous cases, victims and
their families have asserted that, but for an abuser’s status
as a clergymember, they would not have afforded him or her
the access and trust that facilitated episodes of abuse.
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IV. SECOND APPROACH: RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR VICARIOUS
LIABILITY FOR MISGUIDED ATTEMPTS
The following Parts describe three forms of reasoning
that courts have used to hold employers vicariously liable for
employee sexual misconduct. The approaches are all heavily
fact-dependent, yet each in a different way. “That respondeat
superior decisions often turn on subtle distinctions in the
facts, to be left to the province of the fact finder, is due in
large part to the fact that there is no bright line to apply in
determining when liability attaches to the employer.”64
Some courts have imposed liability on the theory that
tortfeasors were engaged in misguided attempts to carry out
authorized job responsibilities. It does not appear that courts
have used this method of reasoning with regard to sexual
misconduct in secular workplaces; the seminal cases have all
involved other torts. In Pelletier v. Bilbiles, a young man
working in a candy shop owned and operated by his father
beat a customer who had littered on the shop floor.65 The jury
returned a verdict in the customer’s favor, but the trial court
entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding as a
matter of law that respondeat superior vicarious liability did
not apply.66 The Supreme Court of Connecticut set aside the
judgment, reasoning that the jury had not been
unreasonable when it found that the son’s actions
constituted “an extremely forceful, although misguided,
method of discouraging patrons” from littering.67 Even
though the shop owner had not specifically authorized his
son to assault unruly customers, he had instructed him to
ensure that customers did not misbehave; the fact that the
son chose a violent method of implementing this directive did
not absolve the father from liability.68 A lower Connecticut
64. Webb v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 608, 614 (W.D. Va. 2000).
65. 227 A.2d 251, 252 (Conn. 1967).
66. Id. at 252–53.
67. Id. at 253.
68. Id.
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court, applying Pelletier, subsequently held the Young Men’s
Christian Association liable for injuries caused by an
employee who punched a patron in the head during a
lunchtime basketball game.69 Among the employee’s
responsibilities was keeping order during games that
occasionally became rowdy, and the court found that the
employee had beat the patron “in a misguided attempt to
maintain order on the basketball court.”70 As in Pelletier, the
court held it not to be a valid defense that the employer had
not authorized, much less condoned, the employee’s
activities.71
In another Connecticut case citing Pelletier, the court
employed analogous reasoning to allow a respondeat superior
claim against a religious order to survive summary
judgment.72 In Mullen v. Horton, the plaintiff sought
pastoral and psychological counseling from a priest of the
Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate who was also a
practicing psychologist. About eight months into the
treatment, Horton and Mullen began to engage in sexual
activity during their counseling sessions, for which Horton
billed Mullen’s insurance company.73 The court held that the
Oblates benefited from Horton’s employment as a
psychologist, not least because his vow of poverty meant that
all proceeds from his practice were paid to the order.74 A
reasonable factfinder could conclude that Horton was acting
within the scope of his employment in one of two ways: either
by construing his sexual activities as a misguided means of
conducting pastoral counseling or by finding that the sexual

69. Glucksman v. Walters, 659 A.2d 1217, 1219–20 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
70. Id. at 1220.
71. Id.
72. Mullen v. Horton, 700 A.2d 1377, 1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997), overruled
on other grounds by Cefaratti v. Aranow, 141 A.3d 752 (Conn. 2016).
73. Id. at 1379.
74. Id. at 1380.
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activities grew out of counseling he was hired to provide.75
Distinguishing cases in which priests had “wholly abandoned
[their] pastoral duties,” the court concluded that whether
Horton was carrying out his work in a misguided way was a
disputed issue of fact meriting trial.76
Yet another case of this sort arose in Oregon, whose
distinctive respondeat superior jurisprudence I will examine
in Part VI. In John Doe 105 and Jane Doe 101 v. Archdiocese
of Portland in Oregon, the court considered the complaints of
two plaintiffs who alleged that a nun had abused them while
serving as their schoolteacher. She held one plaintiff’s penis
while he urinated, hit him with books, and pushed him into
chalkboards, and she refused the other plaintiff permission
to go to the bathroom during class, insisting instead that she
sit in her own excrement.77 The court denied the religious
employer’s motion for summary judgment, holding in part
that it could be found vicariously liable if the factfinder
concluded that the nun’s actions constituted misguided
attempts to promote classroom discipline.78
Like the previous approach, characterizing employee
sexual misconduct as a misguided attempt to perform job
responsibilities has advantages and disadvantages. As in
Pelletier and Glucksman, some cases do feature
circumstances in which employees, seeking to achieve the
outcomes desired by their employers, genuinely do so
overzealously, even violently. This approach provides an
avenue for plaintiffs to recover where such a fact pattern
obtains. But it often stretches credulity to characterize
sexual misconduct in these terms. To the extent that the
priest in Mullen appears to have acted to satisfy his own

75. Id. at 1380–81. The second form of reasoning resembles the approach
discussed infra Part VI.
76. Id. at 1383.
77. Doe 105 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, No. CV 07-1130-PK, 2008
WL 11389644, at *3 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 2008).
78. Id. at *7.
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desires, for instance, it is not credible that he was performing
his duties in mistaken fashion. The nun in Does 105 and 101
presents another instance of what the court called “classroom
discipline taken too far,” but the facts recited in the court’s
opinion seem insufficient to determine whether the nun
thought of herself, or a reasonable observer would have
found her, to have been enforcing discipline.79 Herein lies a
potential constitutional problem, because making such
determinations requires courts to distinguish reasonable
from misguided forms of ministry within any given religious
tradition, a matter normally reserved to ecclesiastical
authorities.

79. Id.
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V. THIRD APPROACH: RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR VICARIOUS
LIABILITY FOR CHARACTERISTIC RISKS
In the next approach to respondeat superior vicarious
liability, courts have held employers liable for employees’
intentional torts that, as a matter of law, they deem
characteristic risks of the employers’ enterprise. The
distinction between this approach and that discussed in the
next Part, which seeks to identify the relationship between a
specific tort and a particular employee’s job responsibilities,
is a nuanced one that parties and even some courts have
blurred.
Exemplary of this third approach is Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, Inc. v. United States. Bushey involved both a state
employer and misconduct not of a sexual nature, and it is
therefore readily distinguishable from cases involving clergy
sexual abuse. Nevertheless, the Bushey court’s analysis has
been so influential in the development of the “characteristic
risks” approach that it requires discussion. Bushey involved
an intoxicated sailor who, in returning from shore leave,
severely damaged a drydock and Coast Guard vessel.80
Reasoning that the doctrine of respondeat superior is
grounded “in a deeply rooted sentiment that a business
enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents
which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities,”
Judge Henry Friendly concluded that the sailor’s conduct
“was not so ‘unforeseeable’ as to make it unfair to charge the
Government with responsibility.”81 Even though the Coast
Guard might not have been able to foresee the sailor’s precise
actions, Judge Friendly wrote, it is well enough known that
sailors on shore leave drink to excess; the United States, by
creating or tolerating circumstances in which such conduct
might create injury, is liable for its employees’ torts.82
80. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States., 398 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir.
1968).
81. Id. at 171.
82. Id. at 172; see also Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1037 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Some years later, a California appellate court relied on
Bushey, and refined Judge Friendly’s reasoning, in a case
involving a subcontractor whose employees became
intoxicated on a job site and battered employees of the
general contractor in an altercation over a bulldozer.83 In
Rodgers v. Kemper Construction Co., the court cited
California’s primary rationale for respondeat superior
vicarious liability: that an employer, rather than a victim or
tortfeasor, is best positioned to absorb and spread the risk of
injury.84 When, the court asked, is a risk so typical of an
enterprise that employers should be held liable as a matter
of policy? Its answer is worth quoting in full:
One way to determine whether a risk is inherent in, or created
by, an enterprise is to ask whether the actual occurrence was a
generally foreseeable consequence of the activity. However,
“foreseeability” in this context must be distinguished from
“foreseeability” as a test for negligence. . . . “[F]oreseeability” as a
test for Respondeat superior merely means that in the context of the
particular enterprise an employee’s conduct is not so unusual or
startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from
it among other costs of the employer’s business.85

As the court noted, with regard to intentional torts the
concept of foreseeability entails something other than it does
in the determination of proximate cause. For the court’s
purposes, foreseeability denotes a typical or characteristic
risk of a particular kind of business, a risk that a court could
find sufficiently inherent in the industry that it would be fair
to assign the risk to employers rather than injured parties.
The Rodgers court concluded that it was foreseeable in this
sense that a subcontractor’s employees would come in
contact with the employees of other contractors on the site,
that such contacts would result in disagreements and

83. Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 146–47 (Ct. App.
1975).
84. Id. at 148.
85. Id. at 148–49 (citations omitted) (citing 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS 1375–78 (1956)).
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altercations, and that injuries would result.86
Bushey and Rodgers have numerous progeny, cases in
which courts have identified activities that, rather than
being related to a specific employee’s job responsibilities, are
characteristic of a particular kind of enterprise. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota has been particularly active in
applying this approach to employee sexual misconduct. In
Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology,
Ltd., a patient sued the clinic that employed a therapist who
had touched her sexually during their counseling sessions.
The clinic’s policies barred all sexual contact between
therapists and patients, but at trial, an expert testified that
“sexual relations between a psychologist and a patient is [sic]
a well-known hazard and thus, to a degree, foreseeable and
a risk of employment.”87 On appeal, and over the strenuous
objection of a dissenting justice, the court found that this
testimony justified a remand for further factual
development.88 This result highlights the blurry boundary
between an approach to respondeat superior vicarious
liability concerned with characteristic risks and a somewhat
different approach, discussed in the following Part, that
inquires into the circumstances of a particular tort. Had the
court employed a pure characteristic risks approach, a
remand would not strictly have been necessary.
The Minnesota high court revisited the issue in
subsequent cases. In P.L. v. Aubert, which involved a
schoolteacher who engaged in sexual activity with a student
on school property and during school hours, the court
clarified its holding in Marston. “It was the foreseeability of
the risk that determined the outcome of the Marston case,”
but in P.L. there was insufficient evidence that teacher-

86. Id. at 150.
87. Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329
N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 1983).
88. Id. at 311; see also id. at 312–14 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
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student sexual relationships are a “well-known hazard.”89 In
Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. North Homes, Inc., where
an employee of a group home for children in crisis was
accused of assaulting them sexually, the court again relied
on expert testimony to the effect that such conduct is a “wellknown hazard” (i.e., a characteristic risk) of group homes.
The court held that a respondeat superior cause of action
should survive despite incomplete evidence concerning the
perpetrator’s
job
responsibilities
or
the
specific
circumstances of the assaults, because “sexual abuse by a
group home parent is sufficiently common in the group home
industry that, as a matter of fairness, an employer engaged
in that business should bear the loss associated with such
abuse as a foreseeable cost.”90
Only in recent years have courts employed this approach
in lawsuits involving sexual misconduct by employees of
religious institutions. In a Connecticut case, Nelligan v.
Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, the court acknowledged
that most jurisdictions have barred respondeat superior
claims for clergy sexual misconduct but noted that relevant
facts had recently come to light. Citing a comprehensive
study of sexual abuse claims in the Catholic Church
published by John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the court
observed that the “number of reported allegations of sexual
assaults by priests has risen so dramatically that one must
wonder whether [earlier judges] would be so quick to
conclude that there could not possibly be a factual dispute
over whether such molestation could take place within the
scope of a priest’s employment.”91 In P.K. v. Hartford Roman
Catholic Diocese Corp., the court employed an identical
rationale in refusing to dismiss a respondeat superior claim

89. P.L. v. Aubert, 545 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. 1996).
90. Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 912
(Minn. 1999).
91. Nelligan v. Norwich R.C. Diocese, No. CV020099218S, 2004 WL 574330,
at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2004).
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against a different Connecticut diocese.92 The study that
both these courts cited, which the U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops commissioned from a prominent secular
research institution, garnered wide praise for its rigor; it
concluded that approximately 4 percent of priests in ministry
had credibly been accused of sexual misconduct.93
In Nelligan and P.K., the import of the John Jay study
was not that it established sexual abuse to be within the
scope of a priest’s employment, but rather that “it can no
longer be said, as a matter of law, that such conduct
represents one of those exceptional cases in which the
servant’s digression from duty is so clear cut that the
disposition of the case is a matter of law.”94 The court in P.K.
explicitly labeled this a question of the “foreseeability of the
unauthorized conduct in question,” drawing analogies with
illicit sexual contact between a therapist and client and
(perhaps remembering, but not citing, Pelletier and
Glucksman) altercations at stores and on basketball courts.95
Neither Connecticut court referred to out-of-state cases such
as Bushey and Rodgers, but their reasoning is analogous. If
it can be demonstrated that a particular kind of injury is “a
generally foreseeable consequence of the activity,” then it is
appropriate to impose vicarious liability when an employee’s
conduct “is not so unusual or startling that it would seem
unfair.”96
The number of courts that have employed this approach
to clergy sexual misconduct remains tiny. One court has

92. P.K. v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. 3:13–CV–00211–
WWE, 2014 WL 4536626, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 11, 2014).
93. JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CITY UNIV. OF N.Y., THE NATURE AND
SCOPE OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1950–2002 4 (2004).
94. Nelligan, 2004 WL 574330, at *2 (quoting Mullen v. Horton, 700 A.2d
1377, 1383 (Conn. App. 1997)); see also P.K., 2014 WL 4536626, at *4.
95. P.K., 2014 WL 4536626, at *3.
96. Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148–49 (Ct. App.
1975).
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sharply narrowed the availability of respondeat superior for
characteristic risks created by religious employers, requiring
that evidence proffered to establish the foreseeability of
religious sexual abuse be precisely on point. In the same year
Nelligan was decided, another Connecticut plaintiff cited the
John Jay study in opposition to a religious order’s motion to
dismiss, but the court noted that the plaintiff had alleged
abuse by a nun rather than a priest. “There are no
comparable statistics or studies involving sexual abuse, or
allegations of such abuse, by nuns.”97 The court granted the
religious employer’s motion.
Advocates seeking to establish that sexual abuse is
foreseeable within religious institutions now have additional
studies on which to draw, and as research into the causes
and scope of the Catholic sexual abuse crises has
proliferated, foreseeability arguments may be increasingly
likely to succeed.98 Jeffrey Anderson, one of the attorneys
most active in representing clergy sexual abuse plaintiffs,
has argued that internal church documents concerning
abuse, which date back to the mid-1980s, constitute strong
evidence of a characteristic risk.99 Moreover, insurers that
previously sold general liability policies that covered clergy
sexual misconduct have ceased doing so, requiring that
institutions now purchase separate insurance against a risk
the insurers perceive to be characteristic of religious
settings.
An approach to respondeat superior vicarious liability
that asks whether a risk is characteristic of a particular kind
of enterprise holds numerous attractions. It provides a
relatively efficient means of allocating risks to the
enterprises that create them, rather than letting injuries fall
97. Sparano v. Daughters of Wisdom, Inc., No. X08CV030199399, 2004 WL
1730183, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 1, 2004).
98. See, e.g., JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CITY UNIV. OF N.Y., THE
NATURE AND SCOPE OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND
DEACONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1950–2002 (Supp. 2006).
99. Anderson et al., supra note 10, § 19.
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on those who derive no upside benefit. Under this approach,
both religious and secular employers would have the benefit
of knowing whether they will generally be subject to liability
for certain kinds of torts, and they would therefore be able to
decide whether to purchase insurance. As courts clarify over
time which risks are characteristic of which kinds of
enterprises, greater judicial economy would result.
But this approach is not without substantial drawbacks
as well. Chiefly, while it is true that certain enterprises do
entail certain risks, there is a fine line between identifying
risks and trafficking in stereotypes. The drunken sailor
whom the court described in Bushey is not far from a
caricature, and it is uncertain on what sources of information
Judge Friendly drew in framing his opinion. To the extent
that such characterizations reflect stereotypes, they may
perpetuate implicit or explicit biases against those who work
in socially undesirable or stigmatized professions. If this
approach were to perpetuate bias against members of
religious groups, it would surely offend what the Supreme
Court has called the “clearest command of the Establishment
Clause . . . that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another.”100 And even if the threat of
stereotyping can be overcome, this approach raises
complicated questions about the legal application of social
science. Thinking about the John Jay College study that the
courts in Nelligan and P.K. cited, one might ask, for instance,
what rate of occurrence of a particular tort is high enough for
courts to deem it a characteristic risk; or what sample size,
geographic reach, methodology, and level of statistical
confidence a study must rely upon in order to count as
evidence. The likelihood of disagreement about the answers

100. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). The stereotype of the Catholic
priest as sexual predator has an extensive pedigree. See, e.g., Angela Berlis,
Celibate or Married Priests? Polemical Gender Discourse in Nineteenth-Century
Catholicism, in GENDER AND CHRISTIANITY IN MODERN EUROPE: BEYOND THE
FEMININIZATION THESIS 57 (Patrick Pasture et al. eds., 2012). I am grateful to
James P. McCartin for this reference.

1010

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

to these questions represents a disadvantage for this
approach in regard to fundamental fairness and judicial
economy.
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VI. FOURTH APPROACH: FACT-INTENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
CAUSAL CONNECTION OR NEXUS BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT
RESPONSIBILITIES AND TORT
Only one approach to respondeat superior vicarious
liability for employee sexual misconduct remains to be
discussed, the one this Article will argue is the most effective.
This approach focuses on the relationship between an
employee’s responsibilities and the tort being alleged, but not
in the categorical manner of the characteristic risk approach.
Instead, courts employing this fourth approach ask whether
an employee’s tortious conduct “arises out of and is
reasonably incidental to the employee’s legitimate work
activities.”101 Other courts have framed the inquiry in
different terms, asking whether the tortious conduct bears a
sufficiently close connection to or exists in a sufficient causal
nexus with the particular employee’s job responsibilities.
This Part unfolds in three movements. First, it explores
cases taking this approach that have involved secular
employers.102 Second, it investigates similar cases
specifically involving sexual misconduct by the employees of
religious institutions. Among U.S. jurisdictions, the Oregon
Supreme Court has developed a particularly discriminating
approach to these cases. Finally, it places U.S. courts in
dialogue with their counterparts in several common-law
countries that have explicitly developed a “close connection
test” as a substitute for the traditional “scope of employment”
test for respondeat superior vicarious liability.
A. Introducing Causal Connection Analysis
Courts have asked about the connection or nexus
between tort and employment in cases involving both sexual
and non-sexual misconduct. In Leafgreen v. American Family
Mutual Insurance Co., an insurance agent took advantage of
101. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 348 (Alaska 1990).
102. In addition to the cases discussed below, see, e.g., State v. Schallock, 941
P.2d 1275 (Ariz. 1997); VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999).

1012

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

his relationship with clients who were also personal friends;
he arranged for their home to be burglarized on a date when
he knew they would be out of town.103 After the agent was
arrested and pled guilty, the clients sued the insurance
company that employed him. The Supreme Court of South
Dakota explained that principals, including employers, may
be held vicariously liable “for tortious harm caused by an
agent where a nexus sufficient to make the harm foreseeable
exists between the agent’s employment and the activity
which actually caused the injury.”104 The court cited
numerous cases standing for the proposition that an
employer is liable where it “put the agent in a position to
commit” a tort, where “the agent’s position facilitate[d] the
consummation of” the tort, or where the tort was “well within
the insignia of office with which [the agent] had been
clothed.”105 These inquiries are highly dependent on the
particulars of a tort and a set of employment duties;
certainly, they are matters about which reasonable judges
and finders of fact will disagree. Indeed, in Leafgreen the
majority concluded that there was not a sufficient nexus
between employment and tort to hold the insurance company
liable. The burglary occurred five weeks after the agent took
advantage of his professional role to visit his clients and
gather information about their valuables; the agent learned
about his clients’ absence from their home because of his
friendship rather than his business relationship with them;
and the stolen property was in any case covered under
policies issued by the employer. But the minority dissented
vigorously, insisting that the insurance company “cannot
wash its hands. It clothed [the agent] with an aura of honesty
and respectability.”106
South Dakota courts have applied Leafgreen to find that

103. 393 N.W.2d 275, 276–77 (S.D. 1986).
104. Id. at 280.
105. Id. at 278–79.
106. Id. at 282 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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there was a sufficient causal nexus between employment and
tort in cases involving a ranch hand who shot a hunter,107 a
bank employee who issued fraudulent promissory notes,108
an employee of a heating and air conditioning company who
assaulted a competitor’s employee,109 and a manager of an
apartment complex who sexually harassed a subordinate.110
Yet the same courts have reached the opposite conclusion in
cases where the connections between employment duties and
torts were less evident. In Plamp v. Mitchell School District
No. 17-2, for instance, the court found that there was no
evidence that a teacher who beat one of his students was
acting in connection with his duties.111
Courts in other jurisdictions have proceeded similarly. In
Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center, a 1990 case from
Alaska, the plaintiff filed suit after a counselor whom she
had been seeing for emotional and spiritual support touched
her sexually during counseling sessions.112 On the plaintiff’s
respondeat superior claim, the trial court granted summary
judgment for the center, but the state supreme court
reversed. The majority looked to a Ninth Circuit case,
Simmons v. United States,113 where the court had imposed
respondeat superior liability in connection with another
therapist who took advantage of his client sexually.114 The
107. Deuchar v. Foland Ranch, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 177, 177–81 (S.D. 1987).
108. Olson v. Tri-Cty. State Bank, 456 N.W.2d 132, 132–35 (S.D. 1990).
109. Kirlin v. Halverson, 758 N.W.2d 436, 441–44 (S.D. 2008).
110. Stanley v. Hall, No. CIV.05-5104-KES, 2006 WL 3138824, at *1, *14–15
(D.S.D. Oct. 31, 2006). Numerous jurisdictions beyond South Dakota have
adopted this approach, including Iowa, e.g., Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701,
705 (Iowa 1999); Riggan v. Glass, No. 06-0396, 2007 WL 911888, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 28, 2007), and Delaware, e.g., Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 201 A.3d
555, 563–64 (Del. Super. Ct. 2019).
111. 565 F.3d 450, 462–63 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Hass v. Wentzlaff, 816
N.W.2d 96, 104–05 (S.D. 2012).
112. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 345 (Alaska 1990).
113. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
114. Moore, J., in dissent, took aim directly at Simmons, writing that
“[c]onduct constituting an intentional violation of professional ethical standards
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court found that the sexual contact had taken place in the
setting of the tortfeasor’s professional counseling activities.
From Simmons, the Alaska court drew the lesson that
“where tortious conduct arises out of and is reasonably
incidental to the employee’s legitimate work activities,” then
the conduct is motivated to serve the employer.115
B. Causal Connection Analysis in Clergy Sexual
Misconduct Cases
This approach to employees’ intentional torts has proven
effective with regard to clergy sexual misconduct as well. It
appears first to have been used in reference to Catholic clergy
abuse in Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan
Corp., a Connecticut case from 1997.116 The plaintiff, Frank
Martinelli, was between 13 and 15 years old when Father
Laurence Brett was assigned to his parish. Brett cultivated
the trust of a small group of boys who were interested in the
Catholic liturgy, forming them into an informal club he
dubbed “Brett’s Mavericks.”117 Martinelli alleged that Brett
sexually assaulted him on at least three occasions, and he
sued Brett and the local diocese after retrieving suppressed
memories of the incidents.118 In Connecticut, the scope of
employment test for respondeat superior vicarious liability
turns on whether “the employee was furthering the
employer’s business.”119 Martinelli argued, and the court
found, that “at least certain aspects of the relationship
between plaintiff and Father Brett advanced the Diocese’s
interests,” specifically, the dissemination of knowledge about

for personal benefit cannot be considered reasonably incidental to the profession.”
Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d at 352 (Moore, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 348 (majority opinion).
116. 989 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1997).
117. Id. at 112–13.
118. Id. at 112.
119. Id. at 117–18 (quoting Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F.
Supp. 66, 70 (D. Conn. 1995)).
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Catholic liturgy.120 Decisive in the court’s reasoning were
facts which linked two acts of abuse with Brett’s
administration of the sacraments. On one occasion, Brett
allegedly performed oral sex on Martinelli after hearing his
confession; on another, he allegedly induced Martinelli to
perform oral sex on him by telling him that it was a way of
receiving communion.121 “Such circumstances,” the court
wrote, “in which sexual abuse was directly connected with
the administration of sacraments in the context of a broader
effort by the abuser to educate and interest the victim in
liturgical reform,” are sufficient for Martinelli’s respondeat
superior claim to survive summary judgment.122 “[P]laintiff
has raised a genuine dispute as to whether or not Father
Brett’s sexual activities represented a total departure from
the Diocese’s business.”123
Similarly, in another Connecticut case, Doe v. Norwich
Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., the plaintiff alleged that her
parish priest had abused her in counseling sessions whose
purpose the court characterized as “bring[ing] plaintiff closer
to the Church and her religious faith, thereby increasing
financial donations to the Church and volunteer time spent
by plaintiff and her family in furtherance of the Church’s
business.”124 As in Martinelli and Mullen, the court in Doe
found that the plaintiff’s assertions about the purpose of the
120. Martinelli, 989 F. Supp. at 118.
121. Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409,
414 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Martinelli, 989 F. Supp. at 118 (where the trial court
states these facts euphemistically).
122. Martinelli, 989 F. Supp. at 118.
123. Id. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed Martinelli’s respondeat
superior cause of action from the bench, for reasons not in the record. See Nelligan
v. Norwich R.C. Diocese, No. CV020099218S, 2004 WL 574330, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2004).
124. 309 F. Supp. 2d 247, 252 (D. Conn. 2004). The court had previously
granted summary judgment for the diocese on the plaintiff’s respondeat superior
claim but allowed her to file an amended complaint alleging additional facts that
connected the sexual assaults with Sullivan’s work on behalf of the church. Doe
v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143 (D. Conn.
2003).
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counseling sessions were sufficient to connect her abuser’s
actions with his employment duties. It denied the diocese’s
motion to dismiss.125
In Pennsylvania as well, a court imposed respondeat
superior vicarious liability on a religious employer. In
Nardella v. Dattilo (No. 2), a priest pursued a sexual
relationship with an adult woman whom he had counseled
during the final illness and death of her mother.126 Their
relationship developed in the context of pastoral counseling
sessions that took place on church property. Analyzing the
Second Restatement elements for the scope of employment,
the court reasoned that the priest’s conduct was of the type
he was hired to perform, that it occurred for the most part
within the time and space limits of his employment, and that
he acted in part “to serve his employer by facilitating
plaintiff’s return to the Catholic church.”127 The court
therefore denied the religious employer’s motion to dismiss.
Subsequent Pennsylvania courts, as well as federal courts
applying Pennsylvania law, have declined to follow Nardella,
although it has never specifically been overruled.128
Of U.S. jurisdictions, the one with the most distinctive
and plaintiff-friendly respondeat superior jurisprudence is
Oregon.129 Beginning with a 1988 case, Chesterman v.
Barmon, the Supreme Court of Oregon has expanded the
scope of respondeat superior vicarious liability to include
intentional torts that, while not committed within the scope
of employment in the usual sense, constitute the

125. Doe, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
126. 36 Pa. D. & C.4th 364, 366 (Ct. C.P. 1997).
127. Id. at 377–78.
128. See, e.g., Doe 6 v. Pa. State Univ., 982 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443 n.8 (E.D. Pa.
2013) (declining to impose respondeat superior vicarious liability on university
over well-publicized sexual misconduct by member of football coaching staff).
129. See generally Michael J. Sartor, Respondeat Superior, Intentional Torts,
and Clergy Sexual Misconduct: The Implications of Fearing v. Bucher, 62 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 687 (2005); Clark et al., supra note 48; LYTTON, supra note 20, at
56–58.
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consequences of actions that were performed within the scope
of employment.130 In Chesterman, the defendant
corporation’s employee took a hallucinatory drug to improve
his performance at work; later, still feeling its effects, he
broke into the plaintiff’s home and sexually assaulted her.131
While the trial court granted summary judgment for the
employer, the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed, holding
that where there is a “time-lag” between an employee’s
action and a subsequent harm, respondeat superior analysis
should focus on “the act on which vicarious liability is based
and not on when the act results in injury.”132 In other words,
when acts undertaken within the scope of employment later
produce harm, the employer is just as liable as if the act and
injury were simultaneous.133
The court first applied its Chesterman analysis to clergy
sexual abuse in Fearing v. Bucher, which it decided in
1999.134 Fearing sued his alleged abuser, the local
archdiocese, and the abuser’s religious order, asserting that
he had been the victim of a prolonged period of grooming that
culminated in sexual assaults. As the court put it, Fearing
contended that Bucher had “gained the trust and confidence
of plaintiff’s family as a spiritual guide and priest and as a
youth pastor and mentor”; in so doing, Bucher had “also won
the friendship and admiration of plaintiff himself.”135 On
Fearing’s theory, which both the trial and appellate courts
rejected, the steps that Bucher had taken to develop a
pastoral relationship and bond of trust fell squarely within
the scope of his employment as a priest and youth pastor;
they were actions such a minister would be expected to
undertake. The state high court held that a reasonable jury

130. 753 P.2d 404, 406 (Or. 1988).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 407.
133. See id.
134. 977 P.2d 1163 (Or. 1999).
135. Id. at 1165.
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could find that Bucher’s actions, at least at first, were
“motivated by a desire to fulfill his priestly duties” and that
the sexual assaults “were the culmination of a progressive
series of actions that began with and continued to involve
Bucher’s performance of the ordinary and authorized duties
of a priest.”136 Citing Chesterman, the court held that for the
purposes of respondeat superior analysis, “the focus properly
is directed at whether the complaint contains sufficient
allegations of Bucher’s conduct that was within the scope of
employment that arguably resulted in the acts that caused
plaintiff’s injury.”137 But the court was careful not to broaden
the scope of liability to include all acts that arise out of
employment responsibilities. It is not enough for the
circumstances of employment merely to provide an employee
the “opportunity” to commit an intentional tort. Rather,
there must be a closer connection between employment and
tort: the acts within the scope of employment must be “a
necessary precursor” to the tort, and the tort must be “a
direct outgrowth” of the employment-related conduct.138 All
of these, the court stressed, are detailed inquiries properly
left to finders of fact.
Like the courts in Mullen, Martinelli, Doe, and Nardella,
the court in Fearing found that there was a sufficiently close
connection
between
an
abusive
clergymember’s
responsibilities and alleged sexual misconduct to impose
liability on a religious employer. But Oregon’s rule provides
greater scope for respondeat superior than either
Connecticut’s or Pennsylvania’s: it opens the door to liability
even when employment-related activities and sexual torts
are remote in time. The Oregon high court took a similar
position in a companion case, Lourim v. Swensen, which
involved a Boy Scout leader who, like Bucher, had taken
advantage of his position to cultivate the trust of a young

136. Id. at 1167.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1168.
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person whom he went on to abuse.139
Fearing and its progeny unfolded against the backdrop
of major scandals that led to the bankruptcy of the
Archdiocese of Portland in 2004. The archdiocese became the
first of at least twenty-three Catholic dioceses and religious
orders to seek bankruptcy protection.140 Its bankruptcy
petition listed at least sixty outstanding lawsuits alleging
abuse by employees, and the resolution of these cases
provided Oregon state courts and federal courts applying
Oregon law with numerous opportunities to test the
boundaries of the state’s vicarious liability doctrine.141
In some cases, Oregon courts found that there was an
insufficient causal connection between a perpetrator’s duties
and a plaintiff’s injuries for religious employers to be held
liable. One plaintiff alleged that when he was seven or eight
years old and scraped his knees in a fall, a priest in clerical
garb walked by, offered to help, and took him to the basement

139. 977 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Or. 1999). See also Bray v. American Property
Management Corp., 988 P.2d 933 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), where a parking garage
attendant stabbed a patron whom he had previously been instructed not to allow
to park in the garage. The court concluded that although the stabbing itself was
not within the scope of the attendant’s employment, nevertheless, as in Fearing
and Lourim, the jury could have found that his conduct was “merely the
culmination of a progressive series of actions that involved [the attendant’s]
ordinary and authorized duties.” Id. at 936 (quoting Lourim, 977 P.2d at 1160).
A number of courts, however, have criticized the Fearing line of decisions. See,
e.g., Bernie v. Catholic Diocese of Sioux Falls, 821 N.W.2d 232, 238–39 (S.D.
2012).
140. For a regularly updated list of diocesan and religious order bankruptcies,
see Bankruptcy Protection in the Abuse Crisis, BISHOP ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/bankruptcy.htm (last visited October 27,
2019).
141. Alan Cooperman, Archdiocese of Portland, Ore., Declares Bankruptcy,
WASH. POST, July 7, 2004, at A01. Outside the scope of this article is the question
of whether punitive damages can or should be imposed in the context of
respondeat superior vicarious liability. The court in Wood v. Archdiocese of
Portland in Oregon, No. 3:11-CV-1126-PK, 2012 WL 950188, at *7 (D. Or. Mar.
20, 2012), declined to do so, finding no “coherent policy rationale” for extending
the reach of Chesterman and Fearing to punitive damages. See generally The
Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts
of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296 (1961).
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of a nearby church. On the pretext of examining the
plaintiff’s knees, the priest had him take his pants down and
then fondled and penetrated him.142 The court held that even
though the priest was dressed as a clergyman and the
assault occurred in a church basement, the priest’s conduct
lacked a sufficient connection with his official duties. The
court stressed that the priest had no previous relationship
with the plaintiff or his family, the plaintiff had not been
active in the priest’s parish, and the plaintiff did not
remember meeting the priest until the alleged assault.143
Even though the Catholic Church generally expects priests
to be compassionate and parishioners to be obedient to
clergy, there was no evidence that caring for injured children
was among this priest’s “particular employment duties in the
parish.”144 Therefore, the diocese was not vicariously
liable.145
Fearing’s distinction between situations where
employment merely provides the “opportunity” for
misconduct and where the misconduct is a “direct outgrowth”
of employment-related activities has sometimes proven
difficult to apply. In another case arising from the Portland
bankruptcy, a court granted summary judgment against a
142. Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 180 P.3d 160, 162 (Or. Ct.
App. 2008). Schmidt’s suit also included allegations against a second priest, who
he claimed masturbated in his presence when he was a high school student. Id.
at 161. The trial court found that this second claim was time-barred, id. at 163–
64, and the appellate court agreed, declining to reach the issue of vicarious
liability, id. at 173–74. The state supreme court reversed on the statute of
limitations and remanded the case for further fact-finding regarding vicarious
liability. Schmidt v. Mt. Angel Abbey, 223 P.3d 399, 409–10 (Or. 2009). The
appellate court concluded that Schmidt’s allegations were sufficient to satisfy the
Fearing standard for vicarious liability. Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland in
Oregon, 234 P.3d 990, 993 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
143. Schmidt, 180 P.3d at 177–78.
144. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
145. This line of analysis appears in a different guise in a malpractice claim
Schmidt later filed against his original attorney in which he alleged that, had the
attorney engaged in sufficient fact-finding about the incident that occurred when
Schmidt was a young boy, Schmidt would have prevailed under Fearing. Schmidt
v. Slader, 327 P.3d 1182, 1183 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
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plaintiff who alleged that a priest serving as a school
principal took him out of his first-grade class, ostensibly for
disciplinary purposes, and raped him.146 The court found
that the priest’s misconduct fell on the “opportunity” side of
the distinction: “The act of enforcing discipline within an
educational institution is not, in itself, a precursor to abuse,
nor is sexual abuse a direct outgrowth of, or engendered by,
the enforcement of discipline.”147 The court stressed that the
abuse was not the culmination of actions legitimately within
the scope of the priest’s employment, as had been the case in
Fearing.148
Fearing’s analysis epitomizes the fine-grained nature of
the causal connection approach to respondeat superior
vicarious liability. Decisions after Fearing have often turned
on slight factual distinctions within and among cases. In
Jane Doe 130 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, for
instance, the plaintiff’s alleged abuser was her uncle. She
testified that he began abusing her while he was a
seminarian, and she alleged that he continued doing so for
seven years after his ordination, even though he was never
assigned to any of the parishes where she and her parents
were members.149 The court found that her uncle’s behavior
constituted the kind of “grooming” for which church
employers had been held liable in Fearing, but it cautioned
that because the abuse had begun before he became an
archdiocesan employee, the church could not be found

146. Doe 130 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, No. CV. 07-1732-PK, 2008
WL 656021, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 6, 2008).
147. Id. at *8.
148. Id. See also Sapp v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon,
No. CV 08-68-PK, 2008 WL 1849915, at *12 (D. Or. Apr. 22, 2008), where the
court granted the archdiocese’s motion to dismiss a respondeat superior claim
against a priest who had hired the plaintiff to mow the parish lawn before
assaulting him sexually. As in Doe 130, the court in Sapp found that the priest’s
status served “[a]t most . . . to create an opportunity for a sexual predator to prey
upon his victim.” Id.
149. Doe 130 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1126
(D. Or. 2010).
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vicariously liable for his actions prior to ordination.150
Although the court allowed the plaintiff’s complaint to
survive a motion to dismiss, it warned that she had pled few
facts that established that “any of the abuse she suffered was
a consequence of actions [the priest] took in furtherance of
his employment duties.”151
C. Foreign Courts and the Causal Connection Approach
These cases from Oregon reveal some of the advantages
and drawbacks of an approach to respondeat superior
vicarious liability that focuses on the nature of the
relationship between employment and tort. But the U.S. is
not the only common-law country where courts have
undertaken analysis of this sort. Courts in Commonwealth
countries have grappled openly with the public policy
reasons for imposing respondeat superior vicarious liability,
and in doing so, they have come to articulate with increasing
clarity what some jurists have dubbed the “close connection
test.”
In Canada, then-Justice McLachlin of the country’s
supreme court urged that courts “should openly confront the
question of whether liability should lie against the employer,
rather than obscuring the decision beneath semantic
discussions of ‘scope of employment’ and ‘mode of
conduct.’”152 Where there is a close enough connection
between an employee’s tort and conduct authorized by virtue
of an employment relationship, she continued, “vicarious
liability will serve the policy considerations of provision of an
adequate and just remedy and deterrence.”153 She was
writing for a unanimous court in Bazley v. Curry, decided in

150. Id. at 1136.
151. Id.
152. Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, para. 41 (Can.). On Bazley and
related cases, see generally Kevin E. Davis, Vicarious Liability, Judgment
Proofing, and Non-Profits, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 407 (2000).
153. Bazley, 2 S.C.R. at para. 41.
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1999, where a former resident of a group home for
emotionally troubled children sued the foundation that
operated the home for sexual abuse perpetrated by an
employee. Although the foundation had no previous
knowledge of the employee’s conduct and in fact discharged
him when another victim complained, the plaintiff asked the
court to hold the foundation vicariously liable.154
The trial court applied the traditional Commonwealth
test for the scope of employment, finding that the abuse did
not fall into the category of “acts authorized by the
employer.” But it had occurred while the employee was
putting his victim to bed, something which the foundation
had authorized. The trial court therefore found the abuse to
be an example of “unauthorized acts that are so connected
with acts that the employer has authorized that they may
rightly be regarded as modes—although improper modes—of
doing what has been authorized.”155 Both the intermediate
appellate court and the supreme court affirmed. Justice
McLachlin wrote that, regarding employees’ intentional
torts, courts should eschew the language of misguided
“modes” and simply ask:
whether the wrongful act is sufficiently related to conduct
authorized by the employer to justify the imposition of vicarious
liability. Vicarious liability is generally appropriate where there is
a significant connection between the creation or enhancement of a
risk and the wrong that accrues therefrom, even if unrelated to the
employer’s desires. . . . Incidental connections to the employment
enterprise, like time and place (without more), will not suffice.156

She then enumerated five factors for determining whether
there is a sufficient connection between the tort and the
circumstances of employment:
(a) the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to

154. Id. at paras 1–5. For discussion, see GRAY, supra note 32, at 79–82.
155. Bazley, 2 S.C.R. at para. 6 (quoting P.A.B. v. Curry, [1995] 9 B.C.L.R. 217,
para. 4 (Can. B.C. S.C.)).
156. Id. at para 41.

1024

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

abuse his or her power;
(b) the extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the
employer’s aims (and hence be more likely to have been committed
by the employee);
(c) the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction,
confrontation or intimacy inherent in the employer’s enterprise;
(d) the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the
victim;
(e) the vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of the
employee’s power.157

Justice McLachlin concluded that the foundation had created
an environment that “nurtured and brought to fruition” its
employee’s abuse. In addition, the abusive conduct was not a
“mere accident of time and place, but the product of the
special relationship of intimacy and respect the employer
fostered, as well as the special opportunities for exploitation
of that relationship it furnished. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine a job with a greater risk for child sexual abuse.”158
The U.K. House of Lords confronted similar issues in the
2001 case Lister v. Hesley Hall Ltd., where the former
residents of a school boarding house sued the school over acts
of sexual abuse perpetrated by the house warden.159 Five
Law Lords wrote opinions in Lister, overturning the previous

157. Id.
158. Id. at para. 58. On the same day that it handed down its decision in
Bazley, the Supreme Court of Canada reached a contrary result in a related case.
In Jacobi v. Griffiths, the perpetrator of sexual assault was employed to supervise
volunteers and organize events for a non-profit organization. A 4-3 majority
applied Justice McLachlin’s analysis but distinguished the facts of Jacobi from
those of Bazley. The justices held that the circumstances of employment had not
clothed the employee with authority under the guise of which he was enabled to
commit abuse; instead, the abuse had occurred only when he abandoned his
duties. There was therefore not a sufficiently “strong link” between employment
and abuse to justify the imposition of vicarious liability. Jacobi v. Griffiths, [1999]
2 S.C.R. 570, para. 86 (Can.).
159. Lister and Others v. Hesley Hall Ltd. [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC (HL)
215 (appeal taken from Eng.), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200001/
ldjudgmt/jd010503/lister-1.htm.
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English precedent and holding the school vicariously liable.
Strongly applauding the reasoning of Bazley, Lord Steyn and
Lord Hutton concluded that the warden’s “torts were so
closely connected with his employment that it would be fair
and just to hold the employers vicariously liable.”160 Lord
Clyde also endorsed Canada’s “significant connection” test,
finding that the warden’s employment afforded him the
opportunity, close contact, and authority that enabled him to
abuse the children in his care.161 Although he found for the
plaintiffs, Lord Hobhouse declined to embrace the reasoning
of Bazley, averring that “an exposition of the policy reasons
for a rule (or even a description) is not the same as defining
the criteria for its application.”162 For him, the traditional
scope of employment test should remain the governing rule,
and he sided with the trial court that had heard Lister, which
held the school vicariously liable not for the abuse itself, but
for the warden’s failure to report it.163 Lord Millett, in
contrast, regarded the trial court’s approach to be
“sophistry”; he thought the school should be held liable on a
variation of enterprise risk theory, because the school had a
duty of care for the boys and the warden had abused the
position of trust in which the school had placed him.164
Subsequent U.K. decisions have expounded on Lister,
not least because, as Lord Phillips wrote for a unanimous
supreme court in Catholic Child Welfare Society v. Various
Claimants, “[t]he test of ‘close connection’ approved by all
tells one nothing about the nature of the connection.”165 To

160. Lister, UKHL at para. 28 (Lord Steyn); see also id. at para. 52 (Lord
Hutton). For discussion, see GRAY, supra note 32, at 36–39.
161. Lister, UKHL at para. 50 (Lord Clyde).
162. Id. at para. 60 (Lord Hobhouse); see also GRAY, supra note 32, at 48 (“It is
somewhat puzzling that a country can wholeheartedly adopt the approach taken
in the leading courts of a comparable nation, while at the same time refusing to
sign up to the policy analysis that fundamentally underpinned those decisions.”).
163. Lister, UKHL at para. 62.
164. Id. at paras. 82–84 (Lord Millett); GRAY, supra note 32, at 38.
165. [2012] UKSC 56, [para. 74] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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fill this lacuna, Lord Phillips framed criteria for testing
whether it is “fair, just and reasonable to impose vicarious
liability on the employer.” These include whether the
employer or employee is more likely to have the means to
compensate the victim and whether the employment
relationship created the risk of the tort the employee
committed.166 Some, but not all, of Lord Phillips’s criteria
resemble those that Justice McLachlin identified in Bazley;
taken together, they articulate what is effectively an
enterprise risk approach. Lord Phillips summarized the
inquiry thus:
Vicarious liability is imposed where a defendant, whose
relationship with the abuser put it in a position to use the abuser to
carry on its business or to further its own interests, has done so in
a manner which has created or significantly enhanced the risk that
the victim or victims would suffer the relevant abuse. The essential
closeness of connection between the relationship between the
defendant and the tortfeasor and the acts of abuse thus involves a
strong causative link.167

The language of these landmark Canadian and British
decisions is not identical to that of the U.S. cases discussed
earlier. All these courts, however, share an overall approach
to disputes in which institutions have clothed employees
with authority that employees misused by committing
abuse.168 Using the language of “close connection” and
166. Id. at para. 35.
167. Id. at para. 86.
168. Courts in a third (former) Commonwealth country, South Africa, have
employed similar reasoning. In the apartheid-era case Minister of Police v. Rabie,
one court held that liability for employees’ intentional torts should vicariously be
imputed to employers either when an employee subjectively believes the tort to
advance the employer’s interest or when there is a “sufficiently close link between
the servant’s acts for his own interests and purposes and the business of his
master.” 1986 (1) SA 117 at 134 C–E para. 8 (S. Afr.). The post-apartheid
Constitutional Court heard NK v. Minister of Safety and Security, where three
police officers had offered to help a stranded young woman get home and then
subsequently raped her. It recited with approval the holdings of Bazley, Jacobi,
and Lister and unanimously reiterated the Rabie standard. Justice O’Regan
concluded that embracing the “spirit, purpo[se,] and objects” of South African
constitutional guarantees, including the right to freedom from violence,
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“causal nexus,” these courts have articulated with increasing
clarity a valuable framework for vicarious liability.
D. Advantages and Disadvantages
Like the three previous approaches, the causal
connection
approach
has
both
advantages
and
disadvantages. For religious employers, one advantage is
that this approach ensures that liability is not imposed
simply because a tortfeasor happens to be an employee.169
Second, the causal connection approach avoids problems that
ensue when courts must decide whether to cognize sexual
abuse as falling within the scope of an employee’s duties. In
Fearing and its progeny, Oregon courts have helpfully
distinguished conduct authorized by an employer (e.g., the
cultivation of trust and the development of a personal
relationship between a clergymember and future victim)
from subsequent sexual torts for which the authorized
conduct paved the way.170 Thus, this approach acknowledges
the extent to which religious traditions clothe
clergymembers
with
spiritual
authority.
When
clergymembers misuse this authority, it is not that sexual
abuse comes to fall within their employment responsibilities;
rather, but for the abusers’ standing in the religious
community, victims would not have been nearly as
vulnerable. The fact-intensiveness of the causal connection
approach provides victims with an avenue to recovery where
a clergymember’s abuse of spiritual authority contributed to
their susceptibility. This approach applies the same analysis
to claims against secular and religious employers, employing
necessitated such an approach. NK v. Minister of Safety & Sec. 2005 (6) SA 419
(CC) at para. 45 (S. Afr.). For extensive discussion, see Albert Jacob van Eeden,
The Constitutionality of Vicarious Liability in the Context of the South African
Labour Law: A Comparative Study (Jan. 2014) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis,
University of South Africa) (on file with author).
169. See, e.g., Ambrosio v. Price, 495 F. Supp. 381, 383–85 (D. Neb. 1979)
(finding religious employer not vicariously liable when priest caused a car
accident while traveling to pay a social call on personal friends).
170. See Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1167–68 (Or. 1999).
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neutral principles and thereby avoiding constitutional
challenges.
But this fact-intensiveness cuts against the causal
connection approach as well. It is not likely to promote
judicial economy, since it requires factfinders to engage in
fine-grained analysis of the relationship between a tort and
a clergymember’s job responsibilities. Both in the U.S. and
overseas, when courts have developed tests to determine
whether the connection between tort and employment is
sufficiently close, they have invoked ambiguous factors and
standards rather than bright-line rules. Courts have found it
particularly difficult to separate cases in which employment
created an “opportunity” for abuse from those in which it was
“a necessary precursor.”171 Finally, to the extent that
distinctions are elusive and may in practice turn on a
factfinder’s perception of a particular employer and its
employees, as well as to the extent that this approach
necessitates discovery into a tortfeasor’s job responsibilities
in the context of the overall conduct of an employer’s
workplace, it might reasonably be asked whether the causal
connection approach is truly one of strict liability, or instead
a hybrid form of negligence.

171. Id. at 1168.
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VII. ASSESSING THE APPROACHES
Its drawbacks notwithstanding, the causal connection
approach best achieves the public policy rationales for
imposing respondeat superior vicarious liability on religious
institutions. This concluding Part compares the four
approaches discussed above and also asks, but answers in
the negative, whether a negligence regime might perform
better than any form of strict liability.
To be sure, strict liability has categorical disadvantages.
Numerous commentators have observed that strict liability
regimes contravene a fundamental principle of AngloAmerican tort law, which is that liability follows fault.
Critics allege that strict liability fails to provide corrective
justice, because it imposes liability even where there is
nothing to correct; they also complain that strict liability
over-incentivizes litigation while over-deterring activities
that, notwithstanding their risks, may greatly benefit
society. Although in recent decades U.S. courts have
expanded strict liability in areas such as manufacturing
defects, and legislatures have created strict liability regimes
such as workers’ compensation, the trend overall has been
against strict liability.
As we have seen, the traditional rationales for strict
liability include deterrence for dangerous activities,
compensation for those who have suffered injuries, and the
efficient spreading of risk and losses. The causal connection
approach achieves each of these ends, yet not at the cost of
expanding liability so radically as to hold employers
responsible for all their employees’ intentional torts. Let us
consider each of the rationales in turn.
First, there is deterrence. It might seem that in
comparison to strict liability, a negligence regime would
better incentivize religious employers to take care in the
selection, training, discipline, and dismissal of their
employees. Under negligence, a religious employer’s design
and implementation of appropriate mechanisms for hiring,
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supervising, and retaining ministers would constitute
evidence that it had taken reasonable care and should not be
held liable. As numerous commentators have observed,
however, negligence regimes may encounter constitutional
difficulties when they seek to assess the reasonableness of a
religious institution’s personnel practices. Religious
employers’ decisions to ordain, assign, move, discipline, or
defrock clergymembers have been held to be beyond judicial
review, falling clearly within the ambit of the muchcontested “ministerial exception” doctrine.172 The Supreme
Court has held that judicial review of such decisions violates
both Religion Clauses of the U.S. Constitution: the Free
Exercise Clause by infringing upon a church’s right to
manage its internal governance, and the Establishment
Clause by creating excessive entanglement between
government and religion.173
With U.S. courts becoming increasingly sympathetic to
church autonomy defenses, an appropriately cabined
vicarious liability regime presents a lower risk that courts
will abstain from adjudicating tort actions against religious
employers. Employers may object that respondeat superior
still requires courts to pass judgment on what constitutes a

172. See supra notes 6–7 and, most recently, Our Lady of Guadalupe School v.
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020). But see Savin v. City and Cty. of San
Francisco, No. 16-CV-05627-JST, 2017 WL 2686546, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 22,
2017) (holding that the ministerial exception doctrine does not preclude courts
from considering whether employment is “primarily religious in nature”).
173. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012). The notion of “excessive entanglement” classically
appears in the three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13
(1971), but has come in for widespread criticism. The Supreme Court’s approach
to its recent Establishment Clause cases suggests that Lemon’s days are
numbered. In one case, four justices refused to apply Lemon to the facts of a
dispute that concerned government funding for the upkeep of a large war
memorial in the shape of a Latin cross, while a fifth proposed to overrule Lemon
outright. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2081–82 (2019); id.
at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). This Term, only one justice cited Lemon in
a case involving taxpayer support for scholarships at religiously affiliated
schools, referring to Lemon’s “infamous test.” Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2265 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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ministerial employee’s authorized duties, but the cases
discussed above reveal that courts are not incapable of
accomplishing this task by employing neutral principles
instead of making judgments that are essentially religious in
character.
But if a strict liability regime appears to outperform
negligence with regard to deterrence, which approach to
respondeat superior vicarious liability should courts adopt?
The first approach, where there is no vicarious liability for
clergymembers’ sexual misconduct, is obviously a nonstarter. The second, which imposes strict liability for an
employee’s “misguided attempt” to perform authorized job
responsibilities, might result in some measure of deterrence,
but it applies to only a small minority of cases. As noted
above, most religious employees who have allegedly
committed sexual abuse have not done so in order to perform
their official duties. For the second approach to create
substantial deterrence, courts would have to regard many
intentional torts as misguided attempts, a position that often
would stretch credulity. At the same time, a focus on
misguided attempts could create constitutional problems of
its own, as it would require courts to distinguish between
appropriate and inappropriate ways of performing ministry
within any particular religious tradition; this might
reasonably be considered an exercise of religious rather than
legal judgment. The third approach, focused on
characteristic risks, would achieve greater deterrence for
employees of certain kinds of religious institutions. But it
would do so at the (potentially constitutionally significant)
cost of stereotyping those same traditions, as well as of not
holding religious employers liable when employees commit
forms of misconduct that courts deem not to be
characteristically associated with the tradition in question.
None of these approaches performs as successfully as the one
for which this Article has been arguing, because the causal
connection approach only imposes liability where a tort is
clearly related to a perpetrator’s specific duties. To achieve
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this end, however, the causal connection approach does
require courts to engage in discovery about a particular
tortfeasor’s duties in the context of a particular religious
institution’s operations. Such discovery would likely steer
clear of the constitutional problems apt to arise in discovery
about the nature of an institution’s supervision of its
employees, but plaintiffs will likely still encounter objections
rooted in the notion of church autonomy.
The next rationale for strict liability is compensation,
ensuring that persons who have been harmed receive
redress. As a practical matter, victims of sexual misconduct
by ministerial employees are likely to receive compensation
only if they are able to win a judgment against a religious
employer. Religious employees are not highly remunerated,
and few carry individual liability insurance. In the Roman
Catholic Church, denominationally specific practices make
compensation even harder to come by: members of religious
orders take vows of poverty that prohibit them, at least in
theory, from owning substantial property, while diocesan
priests are expected to live simply and not accumulate
wealth.174 The situation for plaintiffs is less dire outside the
Catholic Church, but most religious employees do not possess
substantial assets.175 Therefore, to have the chance of being
made as whole as a monetary award can permit, victims
must be able to pursue religious employers. Yet the
constitutional considerations already discussed may inhibit
a victim’s ability to win a negligence judgment, and in any
case, negligence causes of action may be unavailable to
victims where an employer did not have reason to know that
an employee posed a risk.

174. See 1983 CODE C.668, §§ 1, 3 (requiring religious to give away temporal
possessions prior to taking first vows and to transfer to their order all subsequent
income); id. at C.282, § 1 (specifying that “[c]lerics are to foster simplicity of life
and are to refrain from all things that have a semblance of vanity”).
175. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, May 2018 National Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates, https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm
(last visited Aug. 23, 2019).
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Of the four approaches to respondeat superior vicarious
liability, again the first approach does not stand to produce
compensation for victims. The approach involving misguided
attempts does so only to the extent that sexual misconduct
truly occurs in such circumstances, or to the extent that
courts are willing to cognize abuse as misguided ministry.
The characteristic risks approach, likewise, provides
compensation only when misconduct falls within the
parameters of what a court is willing to recognize as a
characteristic risk of religious ministry, either in general or
in a particular tradition. The causal connection approach, in
contrast, stands a better chance of ensuring that victims are
compensated for injuries that occur when religious
employees misuse the authority granted them. While many
disputes will end in pretrial settlements, in the cases that do
go to trial the level of compensation awarded plaintiffs is not
likely to be unreasonable: a recent empirical study has
demonstrated that jurors are likely to award lower damages
against vicariously liable defendants than against
defendants who injured plaintiffs directly.176
It is with regard to the spreading of risk and the
allocation of losses that the causal connection approach most
outshines negligence and the other approaches to respondeat
superior liability. If causes of action for negligence run
aground for constitutional reasons, or if they are
unsuccessful because an employer was unaware that hiring
or retaining an employee created a risk, then a negligence
regime will be unable to allocate the cost of sexual
misconduct to that employer. The first approach to
respondeat superior vicarious liability squarely refuses to
allocate losses to employers; the misguided attempts
approach does so only in a small minority of cases; and the
characteristic risks approach does so only in the
predetermined set of circumstances that courts choose to
associate with a particular religious tradition.

176. Justin Sevier, Vicarious Windfalls, 102 IOWA L. REV. 651, 651 (2017).
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The causal connection approach, in contrast, stands a
strong chance of distinguishing torts that are closely bound
up with the risks and losses created by a particular
enterprise from those where such a relationship is
attenuated or absent. The cases reviewed above indicate that
courts and factfinders are capable of making nuanced
judgments about the relationship between employment and
tort. Consider, for instance, the numerous cases that
emerged from the Portland archdiocese’s bankruptcy. The
courts that applied Fearing carefully examined whether each
alleged tort possessed the necessary causal relationship with
a clergymember’s official duties. In cases like Schmidt,
courts decided that the connection was more accidental than
causal; in cases like Jane Doe 130, courts let uncertain claims
proceed; and in cases like Fearing itself, courts refused to let
religious employers off the hook where clergymembers had
misused and manipulated their authority in order to create
conditions in which they were able to perpetrate sexual
abuse. This fine-grained sorting of factual details resembles
the manner in which courts have responded to sexual
misconduct on the part of police and other state employees,
neither permitting all such cases to proceed nor cutting off
liability as the traditional scope of employment rule might
have dictated.
But it is insufficient to establish that courts are capable
of discerning whether an employee’s tort is sufficiently
associated with an enterprise that the employer should be
held vicariously liable. That is a necessary precondition to
the question of whether courts should actually impose
liability. As a matter of public policy, religious employers are
best situated to bear and spread the risk of losses caused by
the misconduct of their ministers. Many religious employers
possess substantial assets or have the capacity to raise
additional funds through collection plates, other forms of
philanthropy, and auxiliary enterprises. They are able, in
some cases admittedly not without substantial cost, to take
out insurance that would pay compensation to the victims of

2020]

FOUR APPROACHES

1035

clergy sexual abuse. Moreover, they are able to enact policies
that deter such misconduct, including through the selection,
training, discipline, retention, and termination of their
employees. And they are free as well to establish, and invite
victims of clergy sexual abuse to take part in alternatives to
tort litigation, such as the compensation funds that several
U.S. Catholic dioceses have recently created.177 Few of these
things are true of religious employees, who are frequently
unable to make injured persons whole out of their own
pockets. Of victim-survivors, alleged abusers, and religious
employers, therefore, employers are the cheapest cost
avoiders. The causal connection approach enables courts to
discern where the circumstances of employment enabled a
perpetrator to commit misconduct.
This approach, whether articulated as a “causal nexus”
or “close connection” test, or in other terms, is not perfect.
Like all forms of vicarious liability, it is subject to the
criticism that even when courts instruct juries not to take
questions of negligence into account, concerns about moral
blame may “tend to seep into the analysis.”178 To the extent
that finders of fact, whether consciously or unconsciously,
may be biased toward or against a particular religious group,
or religious groups in general, it is possible that either
deference or animus could affect the application of this
approach. The extent of factfinding necessary to implement
the causal connection approach may attenuate the gains in
judicial economy normally associated with vicarious liability
regimes. And as has been noted above, the standards that
courts have developed for determining whether the
connection between tort and employment is sufficiently close
are vague and by no means self-interpreting. In the end,
however, the causal connection approach represents a fairer
and more just balancing of the interests of victim-survivors,

177. See, e.g., Independent Reconciliation and Compensation Program,
ARCHDIOCESE OF N.Y., https://archny.org/ircp (last visited Aug. 24, 2019).
178. GRAY, supra note 32, at 51.
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perpetrators, and religious employers than other approaches
to vicarious liability or a negligence regime. By engaging in
carefully limited factfinding and cabining respondeat
superior vicarious liability only to those cases where a
religious employee has manipulated the authority granted
by her or his employer in order to commit sexual abuse, this
approach focuses squarely on torts that would not have
occurred but for the specific forms of social standing, coercive
authority, and spiritual power with which religious
employers have too often clothed abusers.

